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1. Introduction 
In literature on management science, onerations research and varj.ous 
fields of economics more and more attention is paid to multi-dimensional 
optimization (M.0.) methods as a tooi in moderr decision-making. Although 
this is a relatively new field of academie stucy, decision-makers in 
business and government are already quite attentive. This may be declared 
by the fact that most M.0.methods are able to include a wide variety 
of relevant decision aspects without translating them into monetary units 
or any other coramon denominator. These methods are also able to integrate 
intangibles normally falling outside the realm of the traditional price 
and market system. 
Itt an earlier typology (Nijkamp and Spronk [j978]) we distinguished between 
discrete and continubué M.0.models. Üiscrete M.0.models (oir multi-*criteria 
models) are used in decision problems in which the numbers of feasible 
altematives is finite, whereas continuous M.0.models (or multi-objective 
programming models) are based on an infinite number of possible values for 
the decision arguments and hence for the objective functions. 
In this report we discuss a new Interactive variant of Multiple Goal 
programming (I.M.G.P.). Multiple goal programming, devised and further 
developed by Charnes & Cooper, was one of the earliest practicable 
techniques in multi-objeetive programming. In section 2.1 and 2.2 a short 
overview of multiple goal programming will be given. We believe multiple 
goal programming stil-I to be one of the stronger methods available. lts 
use of aspiration levels and preemptive priorities closely corresponds 
to cecision-making in prac.tice. Furthermore, goal programming problems 
can be solved by the present Standard linear programming routines. 
However, an important drawback of multiple goal programming is that it 
requires a considerable amount of a priori information on the decision-
maker's preferences. We will try to side-step this handicap by proposing 
an interactive variant of multiple goal programming. 
Recently, interactive methods have become rather popular in decision 
analyses. These methods are based on a mutual and successive interplay 
between a decision-maker and an expert (or analyst). These methods 
neither require an explicit representation or specification of the 
decision-maker's preference function nor an explicit quantitative 
representation of trade-offs among conflicting objectives. Obviously, the 
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solution of a decision problem requires that the decision-maker provides 
information about his priorities regarding alternative feasible states, 
but in normal interactive procedures only a set of achievement levels 
(or 'satisficing' levels) for the various objectives have to be specified 
in a stepwise manner. The task of the analyst is to provide all relevant 
information especially concerning admissable values of the criteria and 
concerning reasonable compromise solutions. 
By means of interactive decision-methods a decision-maker may get more 
closely involved in evaluation problems, while he also obtains more insight 
in the trade-offs among different criteria. The feed-back process 
inherent in interactive decision-methods leads to a closer co-operation 
between decision-maker and analyst. Therefore, interactive decision-methods 
may be regarded as an operational application of learning theory (cf. 
also Atkinson et al -[_1_96J], Golledge [j_969~], and Hilgard and Bower Q.96'6]) . 
Interactive decision-methods have also been applied in the field of 
goal programmmg, although the number of its applications is rather limited 
so f ar. In section 2.3. a sample of interactive goal programmmg methods will 
be presented and discussed. In section 2.4. we briefly discuss two 
methods which, just like multiple goal programming, can be characterized 
as sequential optimization methods. Such methods treat the goals or goal 
variables sequentially in decreasing order of importance. 
In section 3 we present a new interactive variant of multiple goal 
programming. This presentation is preceded by an enumeration of the 
prerequisites of I.M.G.P. and is foliowed by a simple example. In the 
fourth section we turn to the technical elaboration of I.M.G.P. Special 
attention is paid to the linear variant of I.M.G.P. Furthermore, we focus 
on the convergence properties of I.M.G.P., together with the existence, 
feasibility and uniqueness of the ultimate and the intermediate solutions. 
An evaluation of I.M.G.P. is given in the final section. 
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2« Multiple Goal Programming 
In this section a brief survey of multiple goal programming will be 
presented. A more extensive survey is given by Nijkamp and Spronk Q977J . 
Subsection 2.1. deals with the general formulation of the multiple goal 
program. In subsection 2.2. we discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
of goal programming. Because we are advocating an interactive variant 
of multiple goal programming, a brief overview of interactive variants 
which are suggested by other authors is presented in subsection 2.3. 
Finally, in subsection 2.4., we show a number of methods treating the 
goal variables in decreasing order of importance - which in fact is also 
done by the multiple goal programming procedure. 
2.1. General Formulation 
In goal programming a set of 'goals' is assumed which are defined by 
the decision-maker. In this sense, goals are aspired levels (targets) of 
certain 'goal variables'. Each goal variable is a function of a number of 
'instrumental (policy) variables'. The set of combinations of the instrumental 
variables which are admissable, is called the 'feasible region'. Within this 
region a solution must be identified that meets the decision-makers preferences 
in an optimal way. It is assumed that the decision-maker's preferences 
for the various outcomes can be represented by a 'preference function', 
expressed in terms of the goal variables or by a 'dispreference function' which 
is expressed in terms of the deviations from the aspired goal levels. The 
mathematical function which is optimized in the goal program is called the 
objective function. Depending on the specific problem formulation this 
function may (hut need not)coincide with the (dis)preference function. 
In its most general form the multiple goal program can be formulated as 
(2.1.) r Minimize f(y , y~) 
subject to 
'( JLQÜ) ~ z + z = h 
| xéR,R - {x | h(x) < h} 
y+ » y" 5-0 , 
\ and y i . y^ = 0 for i = l , . . . , m 
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where f is the (dispreference) function having as arguments the positive 
(y.) and the negative (y.) deviations from the aspired levels (b.) of the 
goal variables g.(x), with i=l,...,m. The feasible region R of the 
instrumental variables x. is bounded by the set of constraints h_(x) • In 
general, the function to be minimized, f, is assumed to be convex. The 
feasible region is also assumed to be convex. In many cases, both the goal 
variables _g(x) and the constraining relations _h(x) are assumed to be 
linear in 2c. We then have: 
(2.2.) f _g_(x) = A.x 
h(x) = B.x 
where A is a matrix of order (mxn), B is a matrix of order (kxn), and 2£ 
is a n-dimensional vector. As shown in Nijkamp and Spronk [£977, pp.7-9], 
the following general form for the function f can be deduced from the 
Minkovski metric: 
+ - (\m + /
 v
+ \ p m _ / -\ p) l/p (2.3.) « , . , , - ^ . ^ J • -i-jji) j 
It is easily seen, that (2.3.) is a weighed (by a. and a.) and standardized 
form of the^ metric. That is, for p=l we get an absolute value metric , 
for p=2 we get a Euclidean metric,and for p —> °° the Chebychev (minimax) 
metric is approached. In multiple goal programming, the weighing factors 
a- and a. may be replaced by preemptive priority factors, by which 
lexicographic ordenings can be handled (Ibid, p.16). 
In minimizing the function f, mathematical programming techniques may give 
good approximations. For p=l and p —? °° even an exact solution can be attained 
when the problem is formulated as a linear program. The same holds true 
for p=2 by using quadratic programming or by means of generalized invetses 
(Ibid, section 4). As shown for thei^-case (Ibid, pp.15-28), some modifications 
are needed to include the abovementioned preemptive priority factors. For 
instance, an aberrant form of the simplex procedure may be used. 
In the fourth section of Nijkamp and Spronk fX977J a catalogue of possible 
objective functions is given for this case. 
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2.2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Goal Programming 
In our opinion, goal programming is still to be one of the stronger methods 
available. It has a close correspondence with decision-making in practice. 
Furthermore, it has some attractive technical properties. Several 
empirical findings from decision-making practice are, in our opinion, 
rather convincing to demonstrate the practical usefulness of multiple 
goal programming. As mentioned by several writers, the method corresponds 
fairly well to the results of the behavioral theory of the firm. In practice, 
decision-makers are aiming at various goals, formulated as aspiration levels. 
The intensity with which the goals are strived for may vary from goal to 
goal; in other words, different 'weights' may be assigned to different 
2) . . 
goals . The use of aspiration levels in decision-makmg is also reported 
by scientists from other fields, like for instance psychology (see for a short 
overview Monarchi et al [J976]). In the same way, also preemptive priorities 
are known in real life problems. Support for this in fact lexicographic 
viewpoint is provided by Fishburn [j974~] and Monarchi et al |l976|. A more 
concrete example of the correspondence of multiple goal programming and 
practice is provided by Ijiri |j965_J, who views multiple goal programming 
as an extension of break-even analysis, which is widely used in business 
practice. 
The above plea for multiple goal programming is of a soroewhat theoretical 
nature. Of course, the operational usefullness of multiple goal programming 
can only be shown in practice. Although it is a relatively 'young' method, 
many applications have been reported in literature. To give an idea, we 
have listed some of these applications, especially in the field of business 
and managerial economics (see Nijkamp and Spronk J1977]). 
One of the technical advantages of multiple goal programming is that there 
.is always a solution to the problem, even if some goals are conflicting, 
provided that the feasible region R is non-empty. This is due to the 
inclusion of the deviational variables y. and y. . These variables show 
whether the goals are attained or not, and in the latter case they measure 
the distance between the realized and aspired goal levels. Another advantage 
of multiple goal programming is that it does not require very sophisticated 
solution procedures. Especially the linear goal programming problems can be 
solved by easily available linear programming routines. 
An important drawback of multiple goal programming is its need for 
fairly detailed a priori information on the decision-maker's preferences. 
As shown by Lane j_Ï97Öj , the correspondence of the behavioral theory and 
multiple goal programming is not complete, because the latter gives a 
specific interpretation of ' satisfyinp; ™oals as close as possible' 
(See Lane, pp.57-60). 
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Goal programming requires the definition of aspiration levels, the division 
in preemptive priority classes and the assessment of weights within these 
classes. We agree with those scholars advocating interactive approaches 
to the multiple goal problem (cf. section 1). Unfortunately, most of the 
usual interactive approaches lack some of the advantages of 'traditional' 
multiple goal programming, such as for instance the possibility to 
include preemptive priorities. Furthermore multiple goal programming can 
handle situations of satisficing behaviour in contrast with most 
existing interactive methods. This situation, combined with the repeatedly 
shown power of the traditional approach to include piecewise linear 
functions (cf. Charnes & Cooper |l977J), justifies the effort to seek for 
an interactive variant of the traditional approach. In subsection 2.3. 
we discuss some of such variants mentioned in literature and in sections 3 and 
4 we present an own effort to construct a new interactive multiple goal 
approach. This method can include all advantages of multiple goal 
programming. For instance, preemptive priorities and piecewise linear 
functions can be handled in a straightforward way. Furthermore, the 
interactive process imitates practice in formulating aspiration levels, 
assessing priorities, seeking for a solution and readjustment of the 
aspiration levels. The method needs no more a priori information on the 
decision-maker's preference structure than other interactive multi-objective 
programming models. However, all available a priori information can be 
incorporated within the procedure. 
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2.3. Interactive Goal Programming Methods 
One of the first interactive goal programming methods was proposed by 
Dyer |j972]. He developed an interactive algorithm for the optimization 
of the multiple criteria problems by interacting with the decision-maker 
and solving a series of goal programming problems. 
A central element in Dyer's approach is the correspondence between the 
one-sided goal programming model and a subproblem of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm 
(see Frank and Wolfe [j_956]) . According to Dyer one may assume that the 
various decision criteria may be included in a utility function U. This 
utility function as such is unknown, but the decision-maker is assumed 
to be able to provide information on his trade-offs among criteria at 
all points. The trade-offs among the decision criteria are, in general, 
not constant, but depend on the values of these criteria. Then the proper 
selection of the trade-offs at a certain point y_ =(y ,...,y ) is 
calculated as: 
ÓU(£) /<SU(y) 
(2.4.) -Wi = - g - — / -g—- i=2,...,m. , 
J x / JI 
which is the marginal rate of substitution of criterion i for criterion 1 
at the point y_. The next step of the analysis is to operationalize this 
relationship. By means of questionaries this problem may be solved. These 
weights are used to find a solution that solves a weighted goal programming 
model. In view of the resemblance of the traditional goal programming model 
and the Frank-Wolfe gradiënt method the latter method is proposed as an 
auxiliary tooi. After the selection of an initial feasible point y, one 
may calculate (2.4.) by interacting with the decision-maker. Then the 
trade-offs are included as weights in the objective function of the one-
sided goal programming model in which the weighed sum of the deviations 
from a set of prespecified goal levels is minimized. Next, one may define 
a directional vector cL = _z, _ Zi» w n e r e jz, denotes the combination of the 
instruments which minimizes the weighed sum of deviations. By denoting the 
corresponding step length by t, the next initial point y_„ is equal to: 
(2.5.) y_2 = yj + t.dL 
Therefore, by interacting with the decision-maker an approximation of the step 
length t(0 < t < 1) can be determined which maximizes U(y„) = U(y. + t.d..). 
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By repeating this procedure a final compromise solution can be achieved, 
for which indeed convergence properties can be proved. 
Dyer's approach is very intriguing, because it relates interactive 
3) 
methods to gradiënt methods . On the other hand, there is as such no 
reason to apply a complicated solution algorithia in the case of a linear 
goal programming model. Another problem is that the determination of the 
preference function U is not quite clear, while also the precise nature 
of the interactive procedure with the decision-maker is somewhat obscure. 
Another contribution to interactive goal programming methods was provided 
by Fichefet [[976]. Fichefet links an iterative method (called STEM) to the 
solution of goal programming (GP) problems, hence the name GPSTEM. The STEM 
method is an interactive decision method composed of a calculation phase 
and a decision phase. During the calculation phase the following successive 
programs are solved: 
(2.6.) / Min v 
v > w. (y. - y.) 
where: 
n (2.7.) y. = E c. x. V. 
i • , J i • i 
3 = 1 
and: 
n (2.8.) yV = max E c* x. V 
j-1 J X 
subject to x.éR V. , 
with R the feasible region for the decision variables x. . The relative weights 
w. are then calculated as: 
0 min I /• . -\ i 
p,- y,- ~ y,- / ( n /' ,• \ o 5 
(2.9.) w, = — i — , p, = ï m 
E Pn-t 
i' = l X 
u m m // . ^ i 
3), I . . . . T — — 1 
See for a general discussion of gradiënt methods also Nijkamp [J972J. 
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where y. is the minimum feasible value of y. during the individual 
optimization of all separate m objectives. 
The solutions y. of (2.6.) are proposed to the decision-maker. If some 
y. values are satisfactory and others not, the decision-maker must 
accept a certain amount of relaxation Ay, for objectives k which are 
already satisfactory. Then the new feasible area is restricted as 
follows: 
(2.10.) ( yk > y * - Ayk 
y 5- y 
^ •'n yn 
where the subscript n refers to the remaining subset of original objectives. 
These side-conditions are introduced in the next step of the iteration 
and so forth. 
The GPSTEM procedure is based on a similar strategy. De decision-maker 
has to specify in advance a best satisfactory level y. for each objective. 
Then step (2.6.) is carried out. The next step is to calculate the 
following program: 
m
 + -(2.11.) f Min v = E (z. + z.) 
I i=l X X 
subjec t to 
+ -y. - z. + z. J
x x x 
=
 ^ i 
n 
y . = E c* . 
1
 j - 1 J 
X . 
J 
X.CR j 
, \ L 
>Vi 
• * J 
The next step is to solve a rather specific parametric linear program, which 
constitutes the basis for a game procedure by means of which the weights 
associated with each objective function can be determined. 
Fichefet's method is a rather simple and straightforward procedure which 
looks rather operational. Some problems inherent in this method are the 
rather mechanical way of determining the trade-offs w.. Furthermore, it is 
not quite clear why the procedure described in steps (2.6.) - (2.9.) of the 
STEM procedure cannot be directly applied to (2. 11.). 
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Another application of interactive goal programming techniques is contained in 
Monarchi et al [197^]. In the latter study the unweighted goal programming 
model is first solved in order to find a provisional feasible solution. 
The next step is to propose this initial solution to the decision-maker. 
When the decision-maker judges certain outcomes as insatisfactory, the 
weights corresponding to the objectives concerned are increased in order 
to find a set of compromise solutions which are satisfactory for the 
deeision-maker. The procedure is repeated until a final most satisfactory 
solution is found. 
The latter procedure is rather practical, but yields the problem of a 
possibly large number of iterations. To a certain extent the whole spectrum 
of values related to unsatisfactory objectives might even be presented to the 
decision-maker. This leads to the question whether it is possible to 
structure in a more systematic way the successive phases of the interactive 
procedure. This question will be touched upon later. 
A similar approach is contained in Price [T976J in which the author assumes 
that goals can be ranked in a hierarchical fashion. During the successive 
stages of the analysis the results of this hierarchical procedure are 
displayed to the decision-maker, so that the decision-maker may vary the 
ranking of the goals and achieve a more adequate compromise solution. 
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2.4. Other Sequential Optimization Methods. 
Besides goal programming, with its possibility to include lexicographic 
ordenings, there are several other methods treating the goal variables sequentiall] 
in decreasing order of importance. Two different approaches will be discussed 
briefly here. 
Van Delft and Nijkamp [Ï977] discuss the use of the hierarchical optimization 
method. This approach is meant for problems in which the goal variables can 
be ranked in an ordinal way as 'most important', 'next most important', etc. 
The method consists of a series of constrained programming problems. First, 
the most important goal variable gj(x) is optimized (subject to a set of 
constraints), yielding the optimal value g,. For this optimal value, a 
tolerance limit is defined as an inequality constraint, which is added to 
the already existing set of constraints. Then the next most important goal 
variable g„ (jsc) is optimized subject to the new set of constraints. For the 
optimal value g„ again a tolerance limit is defined and added to the set of 
constraints. This is foliowed by the optimization of go(x) and so on, until 
all goal variables have been treated successively. Van Delft and Nijkamp 
also present some variants of this optimization procedure, which differ 
in the information need concerning relative preferences with respect to the 
hierarchically ordered set of goal variables and in the quantity of information 
from previous stages in the model used in following stages. The choice in 
favour of one of this variants may depend on the quantity and quality of 
information available. 
Another approach is foliowed by Holmes | 1971_] . This author presents an ordinal 
method of evaluating a finite number of alternatives in terms of a set of 
possibly unquantifiable criteria. These criteria may be called goal variables 
- as in the preceding (sub)sections- except for the fact they may have no 
numerical description. Consequently the contribution of the alternatives to 
each of the criteria cannot be measured on a cardinal scale. However,it is 
assumed that these contributions can be measured on an ordinal scale. This 
means that the decision maker must dacide which attribute contributes 'best' 
to a given criterion, which 'second best' and so on. Furthermore it is assumed 
he is able to define an ordinal ranking between the criteria. In these rankings 
criteria may be judged to be 'more important than', 'less important than' or 
'neither more nor less important than' other criteria. This means that some 
criteria may obtain the same rank (The same holds true for the contributions 
to the criteria). Any alternative can be described in terms of its contributions 
to the various criteria. For example, the contributions of an alternative A 
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raay be given by: 
(2.12.) C" = ( 3, 1, 1, 4, 2 ) 
which means that this alternative is third best for the first criterion, best 
for the second and third criteria, fourth best for the fourth criterion and 
second best for the fifth. Let us further assume that the first two criteria 
are of equal importance, but more important than the third, which on its 
turn is more important than the fourth and fifth criteria, while the last 
ones are again of equal importance. The rank of each criterion is then added 
to its respective score for alternative A. We then get: 
(2.13.) C' - ( 4, 2, 3, 7, 5 ) 
When an alternative assumes the lowest possible value with respect to one of 
the criteria (which is 2 for an alternative contributing best to one of the 
class of most important criteria), the alternative is said to take the first 
position with respect to that criterion. The next higher value is associated 
with the second position and so- on. The positions for alternative A are thus 
given by: 
(2.140 C - (3, 1, 2, 6, 4 ) 
For each alternative such a position vector can be calculated. The alternative 
to be chosen contains the largest number of first positions. If two or more 
alternatives have an equal number of first positions, then the one with the 
largest number of second corresponding positions will be chosen. As emphasized 
by Holmes (p. 191) the method is not a calculation in the accepted sense of 
the word, but rather a way of presenting a complex argument systematically. 
In order to leave decision-makers free to deviate from the results obtained 
by the method described, Holmes suggests some variants of that method, which 
can also be found in the original article. 
The conclusion can be drawn from this section that several sequential 
optimization techniques in the field of multi-criteria analysis may be 
distinguished. Now the question arises whether some of the features of such 
sequential optimization techniques can be used in order to construct an 
interactive goal programming procedure. This will be the subject of the 
next sections. 
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3 INTERACTIVE MULTIPLE GOAL PROGRAMMING (I.M.G.P.) 
In the following sections we discuss a new, interactive version of multiple 
goal programming. Subsection 3.1. lists the prerequisites of the method in 
its most general form. The method itself is presented in 3.2. and illustrated 
with a simple example in 3.3. In section 4 we discuss the technical elabora-
tion of the method. 
^' '' Introduction to I.M.G.P. 
In the method described here we assume that the decision-maker has defined 
a number of goal variables g.(x),...., g (x) , being functions of the instrumental 
variables x, , x (x in vector notation). We assume that the decis ion-maker' s 
1' n -
preferences with respect to the possible configurations of goal variables can 
be represented, at least in principle, by a preference function f. The value 
of the preference function is thus determined by the values of the goal 
variables which are in turn determined by the values of the instrumental 
variables x. This means that the maximal value of the preference function 
f(x) must be found by choosing appropriate values for x. In doing so, the 
choice of x is subject to a set of constraints describing the feasible 
region R. Consequently, we have to find those values of x£R, which determine 
values of the goal variables g(x), for which f(x) is maximized. However, the 
description of the problem is not complete without explicating the assumptions 
about the functional form of the functions, variables and restrictions. Another 
important factor is the nature of the information provided by the decision-
maker concerning his preferences. 
To start with the assumptions regarding the functional form of the goal 
variables, the preference function f and the restrictions, we assume the 
feasible region R to be convex. Interactive multiple goal programming aims at 
maximizing f(x) within the feasible region R. During successive iterations, 
also the goal variables g.(x) must be maximized within R. We therefore 
presuppose that both f (se) and g. (x) (i=l,. .. ,m) are concave functions of x. 
Besides, we assume f to be a concave function in the g.Cx) (The latter is a 
weaker condition than the frequently adopted assumption^ -' that the first 
(partial) derivative of f with respect to each of the g.(2c)'s is either 
positive or negative. So, there are three concavity conditions from which no 
For instance, all methods aimed at deriving efficiënt solutions. 
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one can be eliminated. For instance, f beina concave in the g.(x)'s and the 
g.(x)'s being concave in x not necessarily^implies f being concave in x. 
As mentioned earlier in this subsection the kind of information required 
from the deeision-maker offers another important characterization of the 
problem at hand. To start with, we assume the representation of the feasible 
region is known to the analyst, together with the functional form of all 
relevant goal variables. Although accurate a priori information about the 
decision-maker's preference function is difficult to obtain, there is at 
least some information in many decision problems. It would be a pity to let 
this information unused. On the other hand it must bé recognized that the _a 
priori information is not always waterproof. Furthermore, the decision-maker 
may change his mind while dealing with the problem. Interactive multiple goal 
programming tries to use the a priori information in a fruitful manner, by 
offering the decision-maker the opportunity during the interactive process to 
reconsider his a priori information. The a priori information used in this method 
consists of aspiration levels and of information about existing priorities. 
Aspiration levels may be of a psychological-institutional or of a technical 
nature. The first are expressed as a matter of habit, as a matter of këeping 
up (or beating up) with the Joneses or for some other reason. The second kind 
of aspiration levels occur for example when it is known that exceeding a 
production level of 100,000 units per year will sharply increase production 
costs. Such a production level may then be formulated as an aspiration level, 
because it is very likely that the trade-off between 'production level' and other 
goal variables changes at that point. Sometimes, the attainment of one aspiration 
has preemptive priority above the attainment of another aspiration. Also 
relative priority factors may be known. In both cases, the information may be 
used by interactive multiple goal programming. 
Although f was assumed to be concave in the g.(x), it does not need to be a 
monotone non-decreasing or monotone non-increasing function of the g.(:x), as 
shown for the simple example in figure 3.1., where f has been given as a function 
of one goal variable only (hence we omit the subscript of g.(x) in this case). 
See Nijkamp and Spronk (T977], subsection 4.1. for an example. 
Figure 3.1. The preference function f as a function of one goal variable 
only. 
(x) (b) 
-* g(x) -* g(x) 
Because f is not always a known function of g(x), it is very helpful when we know 
that f is monotone non-decreasing or monotone non-increasing in g(x), for then 
we can accomplish the maximization of f by means of the maximization (or 
minimization, respectively) of the goal variable g(x). If f has a shane 
like in ficure 3.1.c, the nrocedure is less straiehtforward. Let us first 
assume, the decis ion-maker knows that his preference function is maximized for 
g(x)=g . The problem can then be formulated as: 
(3.1) f Max { g(x)} subject to x«R and g(x) « g 
and 
\.Min { g(x)} subject to xeR and g(x) > g 
* 
In fact we have split up the goal variable g(x) in two other goal variables. 
one to be maximized (which will be referred to as g.(x)) and one to be 
minimized (which will be referred to as :g„(x)). Unfortunately, the optimal 
value g is often unknown. For that case, we assume the decision-maker 
can specify a number of aspiration levels g., g 
such that: 
Jk' 
(3.2) f (g])< ••f(g2)< ... <f(g*) > ... > f(gk_j) > f (%) 
This means that the decision-maker can at least specify an interval, in which 
g can be found. Assummg g. < g < gn-.,> we define the problem as 
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(3.3) f Max { g(x) = gj(x) } for x€R and gj(x) •$ gi+J 
and 
Min { g(x) = g2(x) } for x&R and g2(x) £ g£ 
Within the interval g., g.Tl the goal variables at hand, viz. ëAx) and 
g„ (JC) , are obviously conflictive. In I.M.G.P. these goal variables can be 
treated in the same way as the other goal variables defined by the 
decision-maker. As will be shown in section 4 (where we discuss the 
technical elaboration of interactive multiple goal programming), the 
problems in (3.1) and (3.3) can be formulated quite conveniently as 
multiple goal programming problems, although it is ndt strictly necessary 
to restrict these problems to the multiple goal programming format. This 
will also be shown in the fourth section. 
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3
'
2
- Description of the Solution Procedure. 
In this interactive procedure a new solution must be calculated at each 
iteration. A 'solution' is described by a goal vector, the elements of which 
represent the proposed values of the respective goal variables. At each 
iteration one or more elements of the goal vector are subject to a shift. 
However, to simplify the explanation we first describe the method while 
assuming that at each iteration one and only one element will undergo a dhange. 
Thereafter, we shall propose some modifications in order to include the case 
in which more elements can change during the same iteration. 
The procedure is illustrated by a simple example in subsection 3.3. 
Step 0 - First identify the goal variables g.(x), i = 1,....,m, as linear or 
piecewise linear functions of x, the vector of instrumental variables 
x.,x„ ,x . Then specify the set of feasible solutions R, within 
which the preference function f (not 'made explicit so far) must 
be maximized. Notice that some g. (x) may not be defined for all x«R, 
due to i'ts division in two goal variables (as in (3.1) and (3.3)), 
which occurs when f is not a monotone function of g.(x). 
Step 1 - Now successively maximize (or minimize when f is decreasing in g.(x)f' 
each of the goal variables g.(x), i = 1 m, senarately. Thus 
,m. 
(3.4) Max i g. (x) j subject to 
xeR for i = 1,2, .. .. ,m. 
Denote the maxima by g. , i = l,2,....,m and the correspondmg 
combinations of the instrumental variables by x. , i = 1,2,, 
The solution, resulting from the maximization of g.(x) can then be 
given by the goal vector: 
(3.5) [gj(xj), ë2(*iy »gj[(xp' 'SHZ-I^J 
where of course g.(x.) =g.. öi -ï 6 i 
An 'ideal' solution I_, although generally infeasible, is r>rovided by the goal 
vector of the calculated 'absolute' maxima of the goal variables: 
(3.6) I = g T g2' gm 
To ease the exposition we assume f to be monotone-increasing in all g- (JC) . 
Whenever f is monotone decreasing in some g^OO, this goal variable 
must be handled analogously except for some slgn reversals. 
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In contrast with this mostly infeasible 'ideal' solution, a 'most pessimistic' 
solution £ can be obtained with the help of the same information (3.4) and (3.5). 
Moreover süch a pessimistic solution is frequently feasible (see however section 4.4). 
To find the most pessimistic solution let us first write the values of the 
goal variable g. (x) resulting from the successive maximizations (3.4) in the 
following vector (which is not a goal vector ! ) : 
(3.7) 8 i ( ^ ' 8i^-2) 
•x 
'
 gi(xm> 
min Let us denote the smallest element of this vector by g. 
i 
(3.8) gf n= Minm=] (g.(x*)} 
The most pessimistic solution Q is then given by the goal vector: 
(3.9) Q = 
m m 
81 
m m m m 
'2 ' ' °m 
To illustrate both (3.6) and (3.7) let us consider the simple examples in 
figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2. - An illustration of 'ideal' and'pessimistic' solutions. 
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(a) feasible region: ABCDEF (b) feasible region: B'CDEF' 
In both cases the final solution must be found in the intersection of the 
feasible region and the rectangle QCIE. 
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In figure 3.2.a the feasible region R is given by ABCDEF, in which two goal 
variables, g.(x) = x, and g?(x) = x? should be maximized. As can be seen 
easily, g, = 6.5 and g„ =6. The ideal solution thus becomes: 
(3,10) i =£6.5, 6j 
which can be found in figure 3.2a. Note that I exists but is not feasible. 
Clearly, the pessimistic solution Q can be identified as: 
(3.11) a - [ 2 , 3] 
which solution, also shown in figure 3.2.a, is both existent and feasible. In 
figure 3.2.b. the same goal variables should be maxinïized. However, the 
feasible region has been reduced to B'CDEF'. The 'ideal'point I and the 
pessimistic point Q are exactly equal to those in figure 3.2.a. In this case, 
however, both I and Q are infeasible. 
Thus the first step of the procedure shows that a final solution vector S* 
is bounded both by the ideal solution I and the pessimistic solution Q (for 
different reasons,however). We have now: 
(3.12) S/*^I 
because, by definition none of the elements of S_ can exceed the analogous 
element of I_ and because S_ = I_ only in the case where all goal variables 
coincide.(which case may be generally left out of consideration). On the other 
hand, we have 
(3.13) 2 4?* 
Although other solutions do exist in this case it would be unwise to choose 
them. Assume there was a solution _S_ which was judged to be optimal and 
nevertheless did not satisfy (3.13), meaning there would be at least one i for 
which gi(x) is lower than g^ln . Clearly, _S** can not be optimal, because one or 
more other solutions exist for which g.(x) is at least equal to g.ln , 
while the other values in S_ remain the same. Because we assumed the 
oreference function for all g (x) to be monotone increasing, such a solution is 
preferred to S .In section 4 we further discuss the character of the 
solutions, including their existence and feasibility. 
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In I.M.G.P. a solution _S can be considered as a set of minimum values 
imposed on the resnective goal variables. The method starts with a 
solution having very low minimum values, This solution can be improved 
by raising one or more of the minimum values. For each solution £[ 
we can calculate the potential shifts in the minimum values, by which 
we mean the maximal improvement of the value of a single goal variable 
subject to the condition that the other goal variables equal or exceed 
their respective minimum values. When for instance in figure 3.2. the 
values g min min 2 and gT" = 3 are considered as minimum values for gj(x) 
and g~(x) respectively, the potential shift of gt(x). may continue until the 
point where it equals g. = 6.5 (the potential shift of g~(_x) may continue 
until the point where it equals gj = 6 ) . It is clear, that these potential 
shifts cannot be realized simultaneously. Furthermore, when one of 
the minimum values is augmented during the interactive process, this 
implies that the potential shift of one or more other goal variables 
decreases. Such a decline can be considered as the 'sacrifice' (or 
'cost') needed to realize the higher minimum values for the first mentioned 
goal variables. To give a comprehensive idea of the potential shifts, 
we introducé for each solution S_ a (2xm) potence matrix P, the columns 
of which can be associated with the respective goal variables. The 
upper row shows the respective maxima of the goal variables g.(_x), i = 1... ,m 
when they are maximized subject to the minimum conditions which are 
listed in the lower row of P. Thus: 
(3.14) P = 
g*« s • • • g*Ws 
g,(x)s . . . gm(x)s 
where g.(x)0 stands for the value of g.(x) in the solution S and g.(x) for 
1 — o . 1 — i o 
the maximum of g.(x) given the solution S. As suggested in the above example, 
"i — " — . 
when a solution J>, is given by the pessimistic values g. , the potence 
matrix P is given by: 
(3.15) P 
* 
min 
Si 
• • • 
•se 
gm 
m m 
gm 
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Step 2 - Next compile the information available about the decision-maker's 
aspiration levels. To start with aspiration levels of g^(x), let us 
define the 'artificial" aspiration levels g^ j and .g^  as 
(3.i6>r
 g i l = g^
l n 
* 
gik. si ' 
assuming there are k.-2 aspiration levels of g.(x) provided by the decision-
maker which have the property 
(3.17) g-, < 8i2 < 8i3 < * • ' < «ikrl < «ik. 
ï v ï 
As suggested before (see section 2) the decision-maker may have 
assigned preemptive priorities between aspiration levels of different 
goal variables. If available, this information should be stored 
because it can be taken into account in the fifth step of the procedure. 
In the following steps the decision-maker is first confronted with an 
initial solution (step 3). Then he has to indicate whether this solution 
should be improved or not (step 4). If not, the procedure terminates. 
Otherwise, the decision-maker has to point out which goal variable 
should be augmented (step 5). The procedure then determines a new 
(increased) value for this goal variable (step 6), which is next presented 
to the decision-maker, together with some information regarding the 
shifts in the potence matrix (in case this new solution would be 
accepted). In step 8 the decision-maker has to judge wether these 'sacrifices' 
counterbalance the nroposed improvement of the solution. If so, the 
procedure returns to step 4, where the decision-maker has to indicate 
whether the solution should be further improved. If the sacrifices are 
judged to be too heavy, the proposed increase of the goal level is obviously 
too large. Then the procedure calculates a lower trial value for the 
goal variable (step 9), which in its turn has to be evaluated by the 
decision-maker (step 8). 
In order to determine how much a selected goal variable must be 
augmented, we use a m-dimensional auxiliary vector S_ with elements 
&i ( j = l,...,m) corresponding to the goal variables g.(x), j=l,...,m. 
J J 3 ~ 
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We define 6. as the difference of the lowest level of g.(x) being rejected 
by the decision-maker and the level of g.(x) in the accented (current) 
solution S^. (for example, compared with a solution S. = (3, 5, 2) a 
proposed solution S_-
 + i = (3, 9, 2) could have been rejected; in this 
case 62 = 4.). During step 2 of the procedure no proposals have 
been made yet to the decision-maker and consequently no goal level can 
have been rejected (accordingly S. = 0 for j = l,...,m).In step 8 proposed 
goal levels may be rejected, so that some of the 6/'s can become positive. 
J 
Step 3 - Define the initial solution,given by the goal vector Sj, as 
(3.18) S, = [g,,, g2]) ..., g ^ 
which is thus equal to the pessimistic solution (3-9)• Present this 
solution together with the potence matrix P, to the decision-maker. 
Step 4 - If the proposed solution is satisfactory, accept itj.if not, 
proceed to step 5. Denote the subset of the feasible region R, 
defined by the goal levels in S,,by R.. 
Step 5 - The decision-maker then has to answer the following question: 
"Given the solution presented to you (denotëd by j3>) , which goal variable 
should be augmented first ?" Let us assume the decision-maker wishes 
to raise the value of the j'th goal variable. 
Step 6 - In the fifth step we assumed that the decision-maker wants to 
improve the solution S^. , by augmenting the j'th goal variable. 
In this step a proposal solution £•,, is calculated, differing 
from the solution S. only with respect to the value of the j'th 
—ï 
goal variable. This new value g.(x)~ can be calculated in two 
2
 -i+1 
ways. First, the model may use the list of aspiration levels for 
g.(x), as compiled in step 2. In this case the model simply chooses 
the first aspiration level which is preferred to the level of 
g.(x) in solution S. (denotëd by g^x)^ ). For exanrole, when j — —i J — _£ 
g.(x)c was equal to g.-,, being one of the asniration levels listed j — &_. J1 
in sten 2, the pronosal solution S_.
 + 1 can be constructed by putting 
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g.(x)~ equal to g , being the next higher aspiration 
level listed in step 2. To investigate the sacrifices needed 
to reach this new solution, the constraint 
(3.19)
 gj(x) > gjl+] 
is introduced. The method then proceeds tö step 7. The second 
way of calculating g.(x)~ is opportune when it is known that 
J
 -i+1 
the decision-maker does not accept the next higher aspiration 
level listed in step 2 (such information may have come available 
during earlier iterations of the procedure). Let us assume that we 
know that the decision-maker has evaluated a solution g-(x) = 
g.(x)-, + 6. and that he -judged this rise of g.(x) not to 
3 - S^ 3 3 -
compensate the sacrifices needed to reach it. We know already that 
g.(x)„ was too low. Therefore we choose a value of g.(x)~ 
J
 —i J —i+i 
exactly between these values: 
(3.20) g.(x)g = g-(x)s + i.6-
J
 —i+1 J —i J 
As before,the sacrifices needed to reach this new solution must 
be investigated, Therefore, we introducé the constraint: 
(3.21) g (x) > g.(x)„ + fi. 
J — J "~ £.£ J 
and proceed to step 7. 
In order to know whether e.(x) must be augmented in the first or 
. J ~ in the second way described above, again 5. can be used If 6 = 0 
J
 " J 
the first way should be used, which means that we can choose for 
g.(x)~ the first value in the list of aspiration levels in step 2, 
2
 ~ -i+1 
which exceeds g.(x)„ . If 6. > 0, we know that a value 3 — S. 3 J
 — 1 J 
g.(x) = g.(x)c + 6 is judged by the decision-maker as being too 
3 ~ 3 — £_£ 
expensive in terms of 
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the sacrifices needed to reach this value. Therefore we choose 
a proposal value g.(x)~ = g.(x)c + 3.6.. 
J
 —ï+l J —1 J 
Step 7 - Add the restriction formulated in stet) 6 or in step 9 (see later) to the 
set of restrictions describing the feasible region R.. Denote the 
part of the feasible region that remains feasible after adding 
the additional restriction by R. , (Notice that R.,, may be 
ï+l ï+l 
empty, which occurs when the augmented aspiration level cannot 
be attained within the feasible region R,). 
Calculate next a new potence matrix (see step 1» ), but now subject to 
the new set of restrictions. Label this potence matrix Pi+J (the hat 
is added because we still have a proposed and not. an aceepted solution). 
Proceed to step 8. 
Step 8 - Confront the de ei si on-maker with §i and S_i+1 on the one hand and with 
P. and P. , on the other hand. The shifts in the potence matrix can be 
1 -ï+l 
viewed as a 'sacrifice' for reaching the proposed solution. If the 
decision-maker judges this sacrifice to be justified,^accept the 
proposed solution by putting S^+1 = S_i+1 and Pi+J = p i + j - By 
accepting S. , = S_. we may have aceepted a higher level of a 
goal variable g-(x)> for which 6. > 0. Because 6. was defined as 
•J J J 
the difference between the lowest level of g.(x) being rejected by 
the decision-maker and the level of g.(x) in the aceepted (current) 
solution, we now have to adapt 6. for the change in the current 
solution. When 8. > 0,the successive proposal solutions for g.(x) 
are found by adding 2 &. to a current aceepted solution (step 6) or 
substracting |.5. from a rejected proposal solution (step 9). 
This means that by accentinga T5ronosal solution, the value of 6. 
is exactly halved. Therefore nut 6. =5 6. when g.(x) has been 
increased and this increase has been aceepted by the decision-maker. 
(Note that when 5. = 0, meaning that no augmented value of g.(x) 
has been rejected thus far, the value of 6. does not change). 
7) J 
Then return to step 4 (where the value of g.(x) can be 
augmented again, if desired). If the decision-maker considers the 
sacrifice unjustified (or when R.+1 is empty), the proposed value 
of g.(_x) is obviously too high. Therefore, drop then the constraint 
added in step 7. Then proceed to step 9. 
Note however, that the acceptance of this solution may make some of 
the aspiration leyels listed in step 2 unattainable. These aspiration 
levels must be elimmated from the list of stated aspiration levels. 
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Step 9 - We now know that the decision-maker in the given situation 
wants a value of g.(x) which exceeds its value in S., but which 
J -
 < -
1 
is smaller than the value in S. , (By definition, 
—ï+l J 
6. = g.(x)ê ~ g-(x)0 ). Because this is the only information 
available , it is reasonable to choose the new value of g.(x) 
exactly between the values of g-(x) in S. and S. i respectively. 
Label this new proposal value by S/.i» add the restriction that 
g.(xp must equal or exceed the new proposal value and return to step 
7 in order to calculate a new potence matrix P. .. 
Besides the a priori information in step 2, the decision-maker has to give his 
judgments in step 4,5 and 8. In step 4 he has to indicate whether a given solution 
should be improved or not, while in step 5 he has to point out which goal 
variable should be augmented. In step 8 he has to evaluate whether the augmentation 
(as proposed by the model) counterbalances the loss of potence induced by it. 
When the decision-maker is not able to indicate which single goal variable 
should be improved in value, we assume he is at least capable to define a 
set of goal variables which are to be augmented in value. Then, the procedure. 
must be modified slightly. We only give the modifications: 
"3£ 
Step 5 _ Instead of one goal variable, more than one goal variable to be 
augmented is chosen. 
Step 6 - Find proposal values for all goal variables selected m 5 in the 
way a new value was calculated for the single goal variable in 6. 
Step 7* - Before calculating the potence matrix P-+] the set of restrictions 
is extended with the restrictions formulated in 6*. 
Step 8 - When the decision-maker judges the sacrifices too heavy 
to approve the solution, he should indicate 
which of the goal variables having a higher value in S. than ir. 
S^ ., must be reduced in 9 . 
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Step 9 - Calculate a new proposal solution by reducing all goal variables 
indicated in 8 in the same way in which the single goal variable was 
reduced in 9. 
To illustrate this procedure we have given a flow chart in figure 3.3. 
(8) 
(8) 
Figure 3.3. A flow chart of the extended interactive goal programming procedure 
(0) Identify the instruments, the goal 
variables and the feasible region. 
i 
(1) Calculate the potence matrix P, 
(2) Collect a priori information about 
the decision-maker's oreferences. 
Define 6. 
• L. 
0 for j • 1,...,m. 
i (3) Present the start m g solution S_ and 
the potence matrix P. to the decision-
maker . 
-*(*) Is the nronosal solution satisfactory ? 
i 
no 
i 
yes 
Accept 
this 
solution 
Remove from the 
list in (2) all 
aspirationlevels 
that have become 
unattainable 
(5) 
(6) 
Let the decision-maker indicate which 
goal variables should be augmented. 
I 
Calculate the proposal solution £. + ]. 
When g.(x) should be augmented, the 
value of 5. is important. If 6. = 0, 
the a priori information in (2) is used. 
If 5 > 0, g (x); 
-i+1 
5.j(x)s •.!.5]. 
1 
(7) Calculate the potence matrix P i+1 
i 
Define 
*i+i = ii+l 
pi+i = Pi+1 
6J - * ' a 3 ' 
for all augmented 
g^x) 
(8) 
•yes*-
Does the decision-maker consider the 
change from _S^ to J3£+j to be acceptable to 
justify the change from P. tó ?.',"?'.".'.' 
No (or R. . is empty) 
(8) Let the decision-maker indicate which 
of the proposed values should be reduced, 
(9) For all j, for which the proposal 
value g-(x)g must be reduced, 
J
 - i + 1 
def ine 6. = g-OOg - g •(*:)-
J J
 —i+1 J —i 
and redef ine 
J
 —1+1 
- 8 . ( x ) S i + 1 « . 
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3.3. An Example. 
Before the technical elaboration of the method in section four, we 
illustrate the method by means of a simple example. A brick factory can 
produce two brick varieties, but not in any combination desired due to 
the capacity of machines, brick-kiln and drying-room and due to the limited 
available of skilled personnel. We show the area of feasible production 
combinations in figure 3.4, where x, stands for the quantity produced of 
variety 1 and x~ for the quantity produced of variety 2 (both in millions). 
Figure 3.4. The feasible region of production combihati'óns 
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For the planning period concerned management cannot define a profit 
function (let alone another preference function) in terms of x.. and 
x„, due to very uncertain conditions of the market and due to problems 
in the factory where a recently installed machine causes many problems. 
Therefore management wants to consider both Xj and x~ as goal variables. 
We thus have: 
(3.22) Sivx.»x_y x. 
L êo\X.jXnJ X« • 
and 
Although variety 1 can be produced in a maximum quantity of x^  = 9,000,000 
it is the 'trouble machine' causing difficulties when the production of 
x. is higher than 7,000,000 units. In fact this machine runs best when 
around 6,000,000 units are produced on it. On the other hand the factory 
has contracts to deliver 4,000,000 units of variety one. Although this 
variety has been estimated less profitable than variety 2, management wants 
to meet the contractual obligations because the customers concerned also 
buy a lot of variety two and offer a promising buying potential in the near 
future. Thus the preferences fot g,(x) seem to be monotone non-decreasing 
for g (x) = x < 6,000,000 and monotone non-increasing for g.(x) = x >6,000,000. 
Therefore, let us define g..(x.,x.) as the non-decreasing and g1?(x.,x„) as 
the non-increasing part of g.fe.jX-). There are no problems at all in the 
production of the fairly profitable second variety. Management wants to 
produce as much as possible of this second variety (thus max { g„(x.,x„) } . 
In order to discover whether (and if so, to what extent) the desires concerning 
the production of both varieties are conflictive we construct the following 
potence matrix P.. 
(3.23) Pj = * * g n gj2 82 
g n g12 S2 
,1 6 6 9 
2 6 8 
It is clear that the condition not to exceed the most desired volume of production 
can be satisfied without being in conflict with the other goals. Thus we may 
leave g „(xj,x„) out of consideration and eliminate its corresponding column 
vector 'in P.. Proceeding to step 2 we construct the following table of 
aspiration levels: 
This may be done in this simple example. Other examples can be constructed, 
in which this simplification can not be allowed. 
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(3.24) i g u 3 = 6 g22 - 9 
g j 1 2 4 
Vglll = 2 
821 = 8 
The table was constructed as follows. The most optimistic and pessimistic 
values of gj.(x,,x„) were 6 and 2 millions, as can be read from (3.16). 
The only aspiration level defined by management is 4 min, the production 
of variety onè, needed to meet the contracts. In this Way there are thrée 
aspiration-levels for g..(x.,x„) of which the most preferred is labeled 
g...,, the next preferred g,,o and the less preferred gj . ,. Because 
management did not define any aspiration level for g„(x,,X„), its most and 
less preferred values can be labeled simply as g^ dnd g„t respectively. 
In the third step the most pessimistic solution, defiried as 
(3.25) S,= [g u l, g2]] =[2, 8] 
is presented to the decision-maker, together with the potence matrix P., 
We illustrated this pessimistic starting solution S' together with the 
'ideal' solution J^An figure 3.5. 
Figure '3.5. 
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We assume the decision-maker (in step 4) is not satisfied with S_. and 
that in step 5 he proposes to augment the production of the first variety. 
In step 6 we then can construct a new proposal solution with the help of 
table (3.22). We get 
(3.26) S2 = g112' g21 4, 8 
Having added the proposed values of the goal variables as restrictions 
to the already existing set of restrictions, we can in step 7 calculate 
the potence matrix belonging to S„ as 
(3.27) P2 = 6 8,5 
4 8 
When the decision-maker thinks the sacrifice needed to reach 
the new solution is justified, we can define 
(3.28)ƒ S = S and 
P = P 2 2 
which solution can be found in figure 3.6 where we only show the relevant 
part of the feasible region R. 
Figure 3.6. All solutions from the starting solution up to and including the 
final solution. 
^•(x 106) 
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Returning to step 4 we assume the decision-maker wants to raise, given S^0, the 
production of the second variety (step 5), In step 6 we propose the only 
aspiration level for g9(x.,x0) leffi, which is now 8.5. We thus have the 
proposal solution 
(3.29) S3 = [4, 8.5 ] 
for which we can calculate (step 7) the following potence matrix: 
(3.30) P3 = 4 8.5 
4 8.5 
This solution too is shown in figure 3.6. In the 8th step management 
^ 1 •IIIIIIIII.*III»..W<-.W« .-
argues that this sa.crifice (P„ —*• P„) does not justify the improvement 
of the solution (S„ —> S„). We then have to go to step 9 in which we have 
to define a new, lower proposal value for g0(x.,x,j). By choosing this new 
proposal value exactly between its value in S„ and the old S„ we get the new 
proposal: 
(3.31) § 3 = j~4, 8.25J 
for which we can calculate (by retuming tó step 7 ) the new potence matrix 
(3.32) P3 = 5 8.50 
4 8.25 
Now management thinks this shift in potence is justified (step 8). We thus can 
define: 
(3.33)f §3 = §3 and 
P = P 
L 3 3 
which is again shown in figure 3.6. Retuming to step 4 and 5 management 
wants to raise the production volume of the first variety in order to have 
a safety margin in meeting the contracts. In step 5 we than propose the 
solution 
(3.34) § 4 =[5, 8.25J 
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for which the potence (calculated in step 7) again reduces to zero. To 
terminate the example, we assume management accepts this solution as 
the final one by which we can write: 
(3.35) §4 - S4 
which solution is given again in figure 3.6. 
In this example we have omitted the definition and redefinition of the $., 
J because they were not needed in the calculations. To be complete we will now 
show how the 6.'s should have been defined during the successive iterations. 
At the beginning, in step 2, we have 6 - = ó„ = 0. In (3.28) the proposal 
solution is accepted without modifving the proposed goal levels. Consequently, 
6 and ó„ remain unchanged. The proposal solution (3.29) is judged to 
have a strongly positive influence on the second goal variable. Here &0 
set equal to 0.5. The new proposal solution in (3.31) is subsequently 
accented and 6. is halved to 0.25. Finally, the proposal solution in (3.24) 
is accented without any problem, by which 6 remains zero. When this 
last pronosal solution would not have been accepted directly, 6 n would have 
become positive too. 
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4 .TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF I.M.G.P. 
In the description of I.M.G.P. in the preceding section we formulated 
some fairly general requirements. The feasible region R had to. be convex, 
the preference function f had to be concave (both in gA%) and in x) and 
the goal variables g. (x) had to be concave in x. Furjthermore., the decision-
maker had to provide only limited information on his preferenees. He had 
to evaluate only concrete solution alternatives (whether these were 
satisfactory or not) and to indicate in which direction they had to be improvëdT 
No explicit trade-offs or even weights were asked from the decision-maker. 
Although we have represented the decision-maker's preferenees as if they 
could be described by some preference function f, we did not try to describe 
. 9) . 
such a function . Our only aim was to generate a solution to the problem 
at hand which meets the decision-maker's preferenees in an optimal way. 
This can be done when at least the decision-maker's preferenees are not 
in conflict with the concavity conditions for f. 
Given these not very restrictive requirements, many methods are available 
for use within the I.M.G.P.procedure, Besides many mathematical programming 
techniques also other methods may be useful. As an illustration, 
we shall describe (subsection 4.1) I.M.G.P. in linear terms (with respect 
to the instruments jx), by which it becomes accessible for linear programming 
and multiple goal programming routines. The advantages of such a linear 
format of I.M.G.P. are discussed in subsection 4.2. We conclude this section 
with a discussion on the convergence properties of I.M.G.P. and the 
character of the generated solutions (e.g. existence, uniqueness and 
feasibility). 
4.1. The Problem in Linear Terms. 
Formulating the problem at hand in linear terms with respect to the 
instrumental variables is less restrictive than it seeros. First there is no 
extra restriction needed with respect to f. Thus it is sufficiënt that f 
meets the two concavity conditions. We further assume that the feasible region R 
can be described in linear terms, notwithstanding the convexity condition. 
The goal variables g. (_x) , i=l, .. . ,m must be formulated in a linear 
9) Attempts to explicate oreference functions by means of implicit information 
can be found in Nijkamn and Somermeijer Li97jQ . 
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way too. This does not mean that the g.(x) cannot be non-linear. Among 
_ _. 10) x 
others, Ijiri (y[965J, pp. 15-22) has shown that piecewise linear 
functions can be formulated within the linear programming context. 
In f act , he argues quite convincingly (Ibid, pp. 23) that many non-
linear functions in economics are in fact substitutes for piecewise 
linear functions. On the other hand piecewise linear functions may be 
used as approximations of continuous non-linear functions (see for instance 
Goodman j~ï?74] and Laurent jl97^1). 
The calculatory steps in I.M.G.P, consist of the computation of the potence 
matrices P.,i+1,2,... The first notence matrix, P., is calculated in 
step 1. Whenever the lower bounds on the values of one or more of the 
g.(x) are augmented (in step 6) or when some of these bounds are lowered 
(in step 9), the accompanying potence matrix is calculated in step 7. 
In all three cases the structure of the problem is exactly the same. 
Each of the goal variables must successively be maximized (or minimized) 
within the feasible region R and conditioned by a set of lower bounds 
(or upper bounds) on the values of the goal variables. The problem can 
thus be written as: 
(4.1)ƒ Max (c.q. min){g.(x)}, subject to "\ 
x c R and } for i=l,... ,m. 
gj(x)> (<)'gj« for j=l m ^ 
where g. denotes the proposed value of g-(x) for the problem at hand. 
It is possible to formulate the set of problems in (4.1) in a uniform way. 
All problems are then viewed as minimization problems only differing in 
the coefficients of the objective function. Even the set of restrictions 
is the same for all problems to be solved for the same proposed goal 
vector. In order to demonstrate this, we formulate for each of the 
goal variables two restrictions: 
(4.2) fgj(x) - y- + y. = g. for j = l m; and 
V g j ( ^ - y i + y j = gj forj-1 .; 
1U)
 m . 
See for an overview on this topic Nijkamp and Spronk [1_97J7J» section 4. 
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where g. denotes the proposed value of g.(x) in the problem at hand, 
and g* its maximum value (or minimum value) in the first solution S. (thereby 
^ + -
only constramed by x <s. R).. The y and y values measure the overattamment 
and underattamment with respect to the aspired levels g and g. The problem 
can then be formulated as a multiple goal programming problem. Let us 
assume g. (x) should be maximized," given proposed values for the goal 
variables. We then get: 
m yv, <K 
(4.3)/Min { M.. ï. (<x..y. + a.,y.) + M„.y. } subject to 
' 1 • , J J J J 2 i 
x€.R and subject to (4.2) 
a. = 1 and a. = 0 when f is a decreasihg function of g.(x) 
a. = 0 and a. = 1 when f is an increasing function of g.(x). 
The non-Archimedean (see Charnes and Cooper (T977J) weighting factors M. and 
M„ have the property M > » M„ by which preemptive priority is given to attain 
the proposal values g.,j=l,...,m, before g-(x) can be maximized by means of 
the minimization of y.. We assumed that the variables g.(x) could be formulated 
in such a way that f was monotone non-decreasing or monotone non-increasing 
in g.(3c), In the first case, the proposal value g. must be considered as a 
lower bound (which means y. must be zero) and in the second case, g. must 
be considered as an upper bound (by which y. must be zero). In (4.3.) we 
assumed g^OO w a s to De maximized. When f would have been a monotone 
non-increasing function of g^(x), the latter should have been minimized. 
This can easily be achieved by replacing *. in (4.3.) by y. . 
According to our assumption, f needsto be a monotone non-decreasing or 
monotone non-increasing function of all the g.(x), as was shown for the 
simple exanrole in figure 3.1, where f was given as a function of one 
goal variable only. In section 3.1 we proposed to solve this problem 
(see (3.1) and (3.3)) by dividing such a g.(x) in two other goal variables: 
one to be maximized and one to be minimized. Again, a multiple goal 
programming formulation may be useful. Assume the decision-maker has 
formulated for the goal variable g(x) the aspiration levels g.,j = l,...,k. 
First assume that g* = g^ is the most preferred aspiration level, that the 
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preferences for g(x) are monotone non-decreasing for gCx.) •£ g, and monotone 
non-increasing for g(x) ^-g, . Given a lower bound (g, _.) and an upper bound 
level (gh+1) for g(jc), the DOtential shifts of g(x) from below and from 
above can be calculated at the same time by the following goal programming 
formulation: 
(4.4) Min { \ _ } . y"_j + M^ . y- + M^ . yh + M ^ . y*+1> subject to 
g(x) - y*_j + y-_, = gh_, 
g(x) - y* + y~ = gh 
yh+l + yh+l 8h+l gW 
and x e. R 
with MT_J » MT 
and M, « M, 
and y. . y. = 0 
Tn this formulation we assumed g to be exactly known. Let us now assume 
that the only information available is that g must be found in the interval 
[Si, » 8t,+ i]> anc* that the preferences for g(x) are monotone non-decreasing 
for g(x) ^  g, and monotone non-increasing for g(_x) ^  %,+t* ^here a r e aS ai n 
two possible shifts, one from g, to the right and one from g^+1 to the 
left. The problem can be written in a goal programming format as: 
(4.5) Min { M^ . y" + Ml . y" + M y + M^, . y^,} subject to 
g(x) - yh + yh = gh 
g(x) - yg + yg = g 
<•§<£) ~y+h+l +y~h+l -
x e R 
with MJ^  » Ml 
and Mg « M^+1 
and y. . y. = 0 7i i 
'h+1 
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Unfortunately, g is unknown in this case. However, given a solution 
in which gh < g(x) << gh+], we may either put g » gh or g = %+]' W h e n 
such a proposal value is not accepted, a iiew proposal value g is calculated 
by the 6 procedure described in subsection 3.2. 
Thus for each solution ^ . a potence matrix V. can be calculated by means 
of goal programming problems as shown in (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5). For 
each new solution a new set of problems must be solved. These differ from 
the preceding set of problems in one or more of the asoiration levels, 
which are in fact right hand constants in the goal programming formulation. 
To illustrate this we use the goal programming formulation of the example 
in subsection 3.3. In this example there are two goal variables given in 
(3.22): 
(3.22),g](x) - X ] )fê]W =
[_g2(x) = x2 
* for which is given that g = 6 is the most preferred value of g,(_x) and that 
f is monotone non-decreasing in g„(x). From the construction of the potence 
matrix P. (in (3.23)) we learn that the final solution must satisfy the 
conditions 
(4, .6) [2 < g jU) < 6 
is < g2(x) < 9 
Besides these goal levels the decision maker himself has formulated 
the aspiration level g,(x) = 4. Starting with S>, = j_2, 8_J,the decision-
maker wants to raise the value of g.(x), by which he is confronted with 
the proposal S_„ = [4, 8J and the potence matrix P„ which can be calculated 
successively by means of: 
(4.7a) Min { Mj. (y~ + y~) + M£ . yj" } and 
(4.7b) Min { M}. (y~ + y~) + M2 . y^ } both subject to 
(4.7cYgrU) - y, + yj = gj = 4, 
, . -X+ -34- * , 
g ] W - Y] + Yj = gj = 6, 
g2(x) - y2 + y2 = §2 = 8, 
^g2(x) - y2 + y2 = g2 = 9, 
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x &. R and 
y. . y. = O for all i. 
.with M. >» M_ being non-Archimedean weights. 
The solution to(4.7a) will be y. = y? = y. = 0, which means that the 
proposed solution S_~ is feasible and that this solution does not affect 
the potential maximum of g.OO. The solution to (4,7b) will also give 
y. = y„ = 0, but here y„ = | which means that the potential maximum of 
g~(x) reduces to g«(x) = 8.5. In the same way the potence matrices of the 
succeeding proposals can be calculated. For the third oroposal solution 
the right-hand side g„ is first augmented to g„ = 8.5 and then to g~ = 8.25 
which is accepted by the decision-maker. For the fourth proposal solution 
the right-hand side g, is augmented to 5, which solution is accepted as 
a final solution by the decision-maker. Thus, in this final solution, 
g,(x) = 5, g2(x) = 8.25, fj" - 1 and y^ - 0.75. 
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4.2. Advantages Related to the Linear Format of I.M.G.P. 
As shown above, I.M.G.P. can be used together with any (optimization) 
method which meets the fairly unrestrictive requirements ' imposed by 
I.M.G.P. (see section 3.1.). Nevertheless, it may be advantageous to 
formulate the problem in linear terms. 
As suggested in &.2.) and (4.3.) of the preeeding section, I.M.G.P. can 
make a straightforward use of goal programming routines. That is, for each 
proposal solution a set of goal programs can be formulated. These differ 
mutually only with respect to one element in the objective function, 
being the y. , i = 1 a to be minimized. By meaiis of these goal 
programs a potence matrix based on the proposal solution can be 
constructed. For each new proposal solution a new potence matrix must be 
calculated in this way. However, the goal programs belonging to different 
solutions only differ with respect to some of the right hand side constants, 
being the goal levels which have been changed. Clearly, this formulation 
gives access to specific goal programming routines as for instance 
proposed by Lee [7972] . However, Standard linear programming packages can 
also be used. In that case, the Extended Control Language proposed by 
Benichou et al. 
HST?] 
is well suited to implement the modifications of 
the right-hand side values and the successive reoptimizations of the model 
(Ibid, p.317). 
A main advantage of the linear format of the problem is that each solution 
of a goal program contains useful information about the effects of a shift of the 
right-hand side constants (see Nijkamp and Spronk Q_977J, pp.23-28). In an 
extensive overview Isermann |_I977j argues that duality in multiple objective 
linear programming is even more relevant than in Standard linear programming. 
Besides the economie implications of duality he illustrates its decision-
oriented relevance. He shows how information from the düal may be used in the 
decis ion-maker's search for a compromise solution. In the same sense 
Kornbluth |_l_977j_ proposes a method in which information from the (fuzzy) 
dual is systematically used in an interactive way. 
Furthermore, the linear format of I.M.G.P. has all advantages of multiple 
goal programming which were discussed in section 2.1. However, this linear 
format has some additional advantages. Especially, the preemptive priority 
"In some eases, I.M.G.P. (or rather a slightly modified version of it) can even 
be used when not all these requirements are fulfilled. In an earlier study 
(Nijkamp and Spronk LL978]) we illustrated the use of I.M.G.P. in a decision 
situation with a finite number of alternatives (which is in conflict with the 
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factors mentioned before are most easily handled in the linear format of the 
goal program (see Nijkamp and Spronk |1977|• 
Finally, the linear format of I.M.G.P. may benefit by the widespread 
attention paid to the linear programming problem in theory and practice. 
Special procedures developed for linear programming may also be useful 
in linear I.M.G.P. As an example, procedures to identify redundant constraints 
in a linear programming problem (see Telgen Q977]) may be used to 
identify 'redundant goal constraints' within the successive linear goal 
problems. 
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4.3. Existence, Feasibility, Uniqueness and Convergence 
In subsection 3.2. we identified a 'solution' by means of a goal vector, of 
which the elements represent the proposed values of the respeetive goal 
variables. These proposed values are in fact minimum (or maximum) 
values imposed on the respeetive goal variables. As shown in the same 
subsection, the solution which corresponds to the minimum values 
themselves, is not necessarily feasible. For example, the ideal solution 
1^  is generally infeasible. But also the pessimistic solution Q is not 
always feasible, as was shown in figure 3.2.b. One can even show that 
there does not always exist a unique (either feasible of infeasible) 
combination of the instrumental variables, which can be associated with 
a given solution J3. This can be seen with the help of the following 
example: 
(4.8) f Max g,(x) = x and 
j Min g 2 (x) = x , sub jec t to 
L 0 << x < 1 
In this case, the optimistic value for g.(x) is at the same time the 
pessimistic solution for g~(x) and vice versa. The ideal solution is 
calculated as I = 
case Q = 
•x * 
Bi 5 go = 17, o The pessimistic solution is in this 
gj(x2) , g2(xj) = 0 , 1 . Clearly, there does not exist a 
combination of the instrumental variables which corresponds either with 
_I_ or £. However, as mentioned above, a solution is to be considered as 
a set of minimum (or maximum) values imposed on the goal variables. Thus 
in this example, 1^ represents the conditions g (x) > 1 and g~(x.) ^  0. In 
the same way, Q represents the conditions g (x) £ 0 and g„(x) < 1. Although 
in the latter case, there does not exist a value of the instrumental 
variable which corresponds to the pessimistic solution itself, there 
exists at least one value (which moreover is feasible) which meets the 
conditions represented by the pessimistic solution. In this case obviously 
any solution j^= jc_, xj , 0 < x < 1, exists and is feasible . 
For any goal program which meets the condition as formulated in subsection 
3.1., it is easily seen that, given a feasible region R, there is always 
at least one solution j3, which is bounded by both the ideal and the 
pessimistic solution, for which a feasible combination of the instrumental 
variables exists. For instance, when the maximum of the i'th goal variable 
Because of the completely opposite goal variables in this example, the 
whole feasible region remains to be evaluated by the decision-maker. 
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g-00 is attained for x.€.R, the resultmg values of the m goal variables 
can be grouped in one goal vector, yielding the following solution: 
(4.9) S 8,(x-) , g9(x.) , . . . , g.(x.) , . . . , g (x.) ï —1 i. —ï ï —ï m —ï 
By definition, this solution is bounded both by the ideal and the pessimistic 
solution. Furthermore, given the convexity of R and the concavity of gj(x) 
(i=l,...,m) in x, the solution x. is known to exist and to be 
feasible (cf. Kuhn-Tucker [l95l]). By the convexity of R, also the 
weighted combmations of the x. exist and are feasible. 
During the successive iterations of I.M.G.P. the goal values in the 
successive solutions are repeatedly shifted upwards by the decision-maker. 
As noticed before, one can imagine this process as adding new constraints 
to the already existing set of constraints. Because R was assumed to be 
convex in x and because the newly added constraints are linear in _x, 
the part of the feasible region R which remains feasible after adding 
the constraints (denoted by R., i=1,2,...; see subsection 3.2) remains 
convex in x. This means that at each iteration of I.M.G.P. there exists 
a feasible solution, which is bounded by the ideal and the pessimistic 
solution of the reduced feasible region (provided R. is non-empty, of 
course). We will discuss the convergence properties of the procedure in 
more detail below. 
From above it will be clear that, at each iteration of I.M.G.P., there 
exist more than one feasible solution. One may wonder whether I.M.G.P. 
produces a unique final solution. These are in fact two questions. One 
• • '55' 
is whether there exists, given the feasible region R, a unique solution j> 
which is preferred by the decision-maker to any other solution which can 
be achieved within the feasible region. Obviously, the answer to this 
question depends on the decision-maker's preferences. In subsection 3.1., 
we assumed that these preferences could, at least in principle, be 
described by means of a concave function of the goal variables. By this 
assumption, the variety of preference patterns which can be incorporated 
is not very restricted. For instance, even satisficing behaviour can be 
represented by the decision-maker. This means, that the concavity condition 
13) is not a sufficiënt condition to guarantee a unique fmal solution . 
No te furthermore, that a unique solution in the space of solutions does not 
guarantee a unique solution in the space of the instrumental variables. 
The second question is, whether I.M.G.P. converges to an optimal 
solution whenever it exists (either unique or not) and whether it 
produces satisfactory results in the case the decision-maker requires 
the achievement of some aspiration levels. 
The convergence properties of I.M.G.P. depend, of course, on the ability 
of the decision-maker to answer the questions which are posed to him 
during the interactive process, and on the ability to do so in a 
consistent manner. We therefore first assume that the decision-maker is 
able to answer the questions posed by I.M.G.P., that his answers are 
consistent and finally that his preferences (which must meet the concavity 
conditions formulated in subsection 3.1.) do not change during the 
interactive process of I.M.G.P. Given these assumptions it canjbe shown 
that I.M.G.P. terminates in a f inite jiumber of iterations within an €.-
neighbourhood from the final optimum. First, starting from an accepted 
solution, a next solution will be accepted after a finite number of 
steps. To show this, let us assume that the decision-maker accepted the 
solution jS., representing a set of minimally required values of a number 
of goal variables which are to be maximized. The decision-maker next 
indicates that the k'th goal variable should be augmented first. We 
thus may infer: 
(4.10) 6U 
6 % 
> 6 U 
s. i 
—i J 
for j = l,...,m and j#c. 
o • 
— 1 
From this it follows that there must be a solution J3. , which differs from 
_S^  only with respect to the value of g,(x)> for which: 
(4.11) U(jSi+]) > U(S') 
for all _S' which exist for x6(R.- Ri+i^' t n e Part o f tIae feasible region 
1
 . 14) 
which becomes infeasible when ^ + j is accepted . Let us consider such a 
14) . 
This assertion can be proven indirectly, by assuming that for any X , X > 0 
there does not exist a solution S. ,, of which the g, (x) value exceeds the 
corresponding valuê in S^ by an amount X' (all other minimal goal values 
remaining equal), for which (4.11) holds. In other words, for any X with 
its corresponding S.i+], there exists some x'cdL-R. ,} for which the goal 
vector j>' is preferred to §_-
 + ,- In this case, Si' must be preferred to 
-i+1 b e c a u s e it n a s o n e o r m o r e goal variables different from gk(x) which 
exceed their corresponding values in ^ .. (If _s' would have a value of g (x) 
exceeding its value in j>., a solution ^ .•
 + 1 could be constructed for which" 
(4.11) holds. This could be achieved by substituting this higher value of 
8, (x) in Jl.). Since this, by assumption, must hold for any X, however small, 
ttvo value of g (x).cannot exceed its value in S.. This is in contradiction 
. K — , — 1 
with our earlier assumption that the decision-maker, given j3., preferred 
a shift of g, (x) to any other shift in j3.. This completes the proof. A 
similar proof can be given for the case in which the decision-maker, given 
jS., prefers to have a simultaneous change of two or more goal variables at 
-45-
solution j>*
 + i> and let us further assume that its g^ /Cx) value exceeds 
the corresponding value _S; by an amount X, X > 0. How is such a solution 
found for the decision-maker ? As described in subsection 3.2., a first 
proposal solution j>-+] is generated by augmenting the value of gk(x) in 
S. by a given amount, which shall be labeled here as d. When d < R, the 
proposal solution will be accepted. On the other hand, when d > X the 
proposal is not necessarily accepted . Then a new proposal solution is 
calculated by halving the value of d. ïf -=• < X the proposal solution 
2 is accepted. If not, the value of d is divided by 2 and so on. Clearly, 
the proposal solution is accepted as soon as — < X which for X > 0 
2n 
will happen for a finite value n. We thus have shown that each new solution 
S.,, is reached in a finite number of steps and furthermore that all 
—ï+l r 
possible solutions which have become infeasible by accepting J3. ., are 
less preferred than S.,,. r
 —ï+l 
Next we have to show, that only a finite number of solutions must be 
calculated in order to reach a final solution. To be more precise, we want 
to Show that only a finite number of solutions must be calculated before 
a final solution j> is obtained in which the values of the respective 
goal variables differ less than some predetermined £ - value from the 
respective goal values in the optimal solution j>'. At each iteration of 
I.M.G.P. at least one goal variable's value is raised. Because there is 
a finite number (m) of goal variables, it is sufficiënt to show that an 
arbitrary goal variable &.(*) reacties its 'optimal' value g, , apart from 
a small distance of at mostg.,, within a finite number of iterations. The 
k'th goal variable is chosen to be augmented whenever condition (4.10) holds. 
Without further requirements with respect to the decision-maker's preference 
structure, it is not sure whether condition (4.10) will ever hold for each 
goal variable, at least within the feasible region R. For example, one 
goal variable may be judged to be far more important than each of the 
other goal variables. When the decision-maker has to meet many and/or 
very strong restrictions it may be that this important goal variable 
'consumes' the whole feasible region. In that case, the accompanying 
values of the other goal variables must be considered as being optimal. 
However, let us assume, that g, (JJ) reac.hes its most preferred value within 
the feasible region R for g, > g, , the pessimistic value of & (x) and 
We thus assume that the decision-maker evaluates a shift of one of the goal 
variables in a way which is consistent with (4.11). For this evaluation he 
uses the information presented in the potence matrices. 
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that this value is not automatically attained, as in the above example. 
Let us further assume, that the decision-maker has not defined any 
aspiration level for gkGO« In this case we only know that g, < g, < g, . 
where g, again is the maximum value of g, (x) for x&L. As described in 
subsection 3.2., a proposal solution is calculated as g, = (g, - g, )/2. 
From the answer of the decision-maker we can infer whether g, > g, or 
g£ < gk. We then know either that gj.ln < g° < g^ or that gfc < g° < g*. 
At the next iteration a new proposal solution is chosen exactly in the 
middle of the chosen region. Thus, the range in which g° must be found 
is exactly halved at each time the decision-maker is consulted, This 
means that the £.- neighbourhood of g, is reached when, 
(4.12) (g^-g^11) 
< t, 
2n "k ' 
where n is the number of times the decision-maker gives his opinion on g, , 
In general, this £. - neighbourhood will be attained in less steps. This 
is because the aspiration levels which have been defined a priori, may 
be of great help during the search procedure. Furthermore g^ is mfluenced 
by the values which are required for the other goal variables. 
Some final remarks need to be made on the assumed consistency and the 
preference structure which has been supposed not to change during the 
interactive process. Obviously, the decision-maker may make errors 
while expressing his preferences. Furthermore, as mentioned in section 2, 
the decision-maker may learn from the interactive process. For example, 
the decision-maker may recognize that a proposed shift in a single goal 
variable is outweighed by a simultaneous shift in two other goal variables. 
He may then wish to return to the preceding solution to ask for such a 
simultaneous shift. In our opinion, two devices are needed to circumvent 
this kind of difficulties. First, the decision-maker must have the possibility 
to stop the interactive procedure and to return to an earlier solution. 
Second, it is wise to repeat the whole interactive procedure when a final 
solution has been found. 
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5. Evaluation 
In this final section we mention some of the main features of I.M.G.P. 
point by point. 
* I.M.G.P. is a continuous multi-dimensional optimization method (or 
multi-objective-programming model), because it is based on an infinite 
number of possible values for the decision arguments and hence for 
the objective function '. 
•x I.M.G.P. is interactive, because it is based on a mutual and successive 
interplay between a decision-maker and an expert (or analyst). 
* I.M.G.P. needs no more a priori information than other Interactive 
programming models. However, all available a priori information can be 
incorporated within the procedure. Notably, aspiration levels and 
preemptive priorities which have been defined by the decision-maker can 
be incorporated in the interactive process quite easily. Besides, I.M.G.P. 
offers the decision-maker the opportunity to reconsider this a priori 
information during the interactive process. 
* In I.M.G.P. the goal variables are assumed to be known and concave in 
the instrumental variables. The preference function of the decision-maker 
is not assumed to be known. However, it is assumed to be concave, both 
in the goal variables and in the instrumental variables. Clearly, these 
assumptions are not very restrictive. For instance, both optimizing and 
satisficing behaviour can be incorporated. 
•x The decision-maker only has to give information on his local preferences. 
This is done on basis of a solution and a potence matrix presented to 
him. A solution is a vector of minimum values for the respective goal 
variables. The potence matrix shows for each of these goal variables 
separately the maximum value, given the solution concerned. The decision-
maker only has to indicate whether a solution is satisfactory or not, and 
if not, which of the minimum goal values should be raised. He does not have 
to specify how much these goal values should be raised. Nor there is any 
need to specify weighing factors. A new solution is presented to him 
together with a new potence matrix. He then has to indicate whether the 
shifts in the solution outweigh the shifts in the potence matrix. If not, 
a new solution is calculated and so on. 
However, with some minor modifications I.M.G.P. can also be applied to 
discrete decision models (see Nijkamp and Spronk |J978J). 
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•x- Given a consistent decision-maker, I.M.G.P. converges within a finite 
number of iterations to a final solution, which exists and is feasible. 
Apart from an€ - neighbourhood, this solution is optimal. Whether this 
optimal solution is unique or not, depends on the decision-maker's 
preferences. 
* Given a new (proposal) solution, the maxima of the goal variables must 
be (re)calculated at each iteration of I.M.G.P. This can be done with 
the help of any optimization method which meets the not very restrictive 
requirements imposed by I.M.G.P. (i.e. convexity of the feasible region K. 
and concavity of the preference function and the goal variables). Nevertheless, 
it may be advantageous to formulate the problem in linear terms. Then, 
I.M.G.P. can make a straightforward use of goal programming routines. 
The advantages of this approach are sketched in subsections 2.1. and 
4.2. 
* It must be stressed that the described advantages only hold, when the 
decision-maker meets the requirements of I.M.G.P. He must be able to 
answer the questions posed by I.M.G.P. His answers must be consistent, 
although he is allowed to make some errors during the interactive process. 
Finally, because of the possible learning effects, the procedure must 
be repeated several times to be sure that a final solution is found 
which is as close as possible to the optimum. 
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